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Abstract:
Analyses of path-dependence that consider explicitly the linkages between dynamics present at different levels
of analysis are needed to improve current understandings of the evolution of industrial sectors. This paper
undertakes such analysis in the Console Games sector, articulating the impact of the innovation activities of
video games studios producing complementary inputs on its technological trajectory and dominant design. The
recent introduction of a new dominant design in the sector constitutes a natural experiment that indicates the
presence of inertias in the innovation behaviours of these agents. These inertias are explored through an in-
depth study of 7 UK games studios, which identifies self-reinforcing organisational, management and
recruitment practices linked to the culture and values of the communities involved in games development,
resulting in cultural homogeneity in both workforce and management positions. This homogeneity favours
incremental innovation and obstructs the exploration of alternative dominant designs, thus impacting on the
outcomes of market competition, and shaping the sector s technological trajectory
JEL - codes: O31, L23, -
 1
Sticking to their guns: The impact of the culture and organisational practices of 
video games studios on the technological trajectory of the console games sector 
 
Abstract 
Analyses of path-dependence that consider explicitly the linkages between 
dynamics present at different levels of analysis are needed to improve current 
understandings of the evolution of industrial sectors. This paper undertakes such 
analysis in the Console Games sector, articulating the impact of the innovation 
activities of video games studios producing complementary inputs on its 
technological trajectory and domAinant design. The recent introduction of a new 
dominant design in the sector constitutes a natural experiment that indicates the 
presence of inertias in the innovation behaviours of these agents. These inertias 
are explored through an in-depth study of 7 UK games studios, which identifies 
self-reinforcing organisational, management and recruitment practices linked to 
the culture and values of the communities involved in games development, 
resulting in cultural homogeneity in workforce and management. This 
homogeneity favours incremental innovation, obstructing the exploration of 
alternative dominant designs, impacting on the outcomes of market competition, 
and shaping the sector’s technological trajectory. 
 
1. Introduction 
Path dependence can explain organisational and market inertias without the need to 
assume lack of reflection or irrationality on actors’ behaviours.  It arises from the 
necessity to take decisions and the consequential constraints that these decisions might 
impose as experience and investment make retracing steps or branching to another 
path costly or prohibitively expensive (David, 1991, Arthur, 1989). These processes 
have been examined at the level of the individual, the firm, the industrial relationship 
and, particularly, the sector. The interplay between commitments that create 
constraints- and hence path-dependent dynamics- at different levels of analysis has 
been examined less often - it has been argued recently that more explicit analyses of 
these interlinkages (‘cross catalytic-feedbacks’) are necessary in order to improve 
current understandings of the way in which industries and technologies evolve (Sydow 
et al, 2009). 
 
This paper addresses this gap in the literature by examining the linkage between 
organisational, relationship and sector-level path-dependencies in the console games 
sector. It articulates a mechanism through which firm-level actions contribute to the 
emergence of a dominant design with path dependent features- the decision to produce 
complementary goods- establish a relationship- that increases the attractiveness of a 
specific platform versus its competitors. An analysis of established development 
studios’ reaction to the introduction of an alternative dominant design in the consoles 
market suggests that those decisions are, themselves, subject to inertias that are 
subsequently examined in an in-depth study of 7 UK games development studios. This 
analysis leads to the identification of a path-dependent driver for their behaviour- the 
values and motivations of the communities of practice who work in those firms. These 
values have been perpetuated from the early days of the sector via development 
practices and recruitment strategies that induce cultural homogeneity in its workforce 
and managers, encouraging exploitative innovation that targets the existing dominant 
design, and hinders exploration of the emergent one, thus weakening it.  
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In addition to providing an integrated analysis of path-dependence at the firm, 
relationship and sector level, the paper contributes to a growing body of literature 
examining the role of social and cultural factors in shaping the direction of technical 
change in high-technology sectors (Garud and Rappa, 1994, Kaplan and Tripsas). In 
particular, it provides an important complement to dominant understandings of 
competition in two-sided markets, which have tended to focus on economic factors such 
as installed user bases, switching costs and network effects in order to explain the 
innovation and adoption decisions of co-developers and users (Varian and Shapiro, 
1999, Rochet and Tirole, 2003, Shankar and Bayus, 2003). 
 
The paper suggests that studies of path-dependence should incorporate a third possible 
situation besides those of inertia-driven helplessness, where agents are unable to 
deviate from a historically determined trajectory, and path-creating actions where they 
exercise their agency to break away from it (Garud and Karnøe, 2001).  This third 
situation is one where actors exercise their agency to sustain an existing, inefficient 
path with historically dependent features because they derive non-economical benefits 
from doing so. This case is exemplified by the behaviours of video games’ developers 
who have decided to support the increasingly unsustainable trajectory of the traditional 
dominant design in the console games sector, rather than targeting a more affordable, 
and faster growing platform. This strategy, which might seem path-dependent in the 
traditional sense- as if they did not have another option-, or even irrational, becomes 
more tractable when the culture of the community of practice behind it is introduced 
into the analysis. 
 
Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on technological trajectories, dominant design, 
path dependence, communities of practice and the emergence and evolution of the 
video games sector. Section 3 outlines the empirical setting of this paper, discussing 
technological trajectory and dominant designs in the console games sector, and 
describing its recent evolution. Section 4 outlines the methodology and data sources for 
the qualitative stage of the research where the sources of this seemingly anomalous 
behaviour are examined. Section 5 discusses the findings of the paper, outlines its 
contributions and limitations, and outlines issues for further research. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
a) Technological trajectories and dominant designs 
 
The concept of technological trajectory was first adopted in the late 1970s to describe 
and explain different patterns of technical change across industrial sectors (Nelson and 
Winter 1977, Dosi 1982). The concept has enabled scholars of innovation to examine 
the logic behind the cumulative processes through which the direction of technological 
change in a sector is determined (Freeman et al .1982). A sector’s technological 
trajectory is driven by the innovative activities of different actors- including users, 
manufacturers and suppliers- (Pavitt, 1984, von Hippel 1988), the nature of market 
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demand and the regime of appropriability over the value generated through 
innovation.1 
 
Technological trajectories represent long-term, macro-level patterns of innovation at 
the sector level.  Such trajectories often reflect sustained incremental innovation in 
which specific technical parameters are stretched, enhanced, or augmented by taking 
advantage of new scientific or technological knowledge, or experience with process 
technologies.  In some sectors, and particularly in electronics, the long term trajectory 
obscures a serial process of major innovation in which the performance variable 
defining the trajectory is addressed using radically different process techniques or 
architectures.  In each of these incidences of major innovation dominant designs emerge 
after a period of ‘ferment’ phase that the major and disruptive innovation produces.  A 
dominant design can occur at the level of an entire product (Henderson and Clark 1990, 
Utterback and Suarez 1993), or at the component level (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978, 
Anderson and Tushman 1990). It represents a moment of relative stability before 
change begins again, at first incrementally (Anderson and Tushman 1990), and later 
through major or radical revision which, after another period of ferment, results in a 
new dominant design.  
 
Several mechanisms may lead to the emergence of a dominant design. In some cases, 
this design constitutes the best compromise for addressing a predominant share of 
market demand - for example between quality and cost- and as such is widely imitated 
across the sector (Christensen et al 1998). Dominant designs can also emerge as a 
consequence of economies of scale that favour standardisation (Klepper 1997), or of 
network effects- as when users purchase a compatible technology, or acquire skills 
which are only relevant for a given design (David 1985, Arthur 1989).  
 
Extant analyses of competition in two-sided markets where complementarities between 
different parts of a system are particularly important, have shown how the proponents 
of different ICT system (‘platform holders’) compete to achieve a ’dominant design’ 
status by building coalitions of suppliers (‘complementors’) who provide 
complementary (and compatible) resources that increase the attractiveness of their 
system for users (Cusumano et al., 1992, Varian and Shapiro, 1999).2  
 
In addition to technology and market forces, there are other factors that determine the 
shape of a dominant design. Actors often draw on their social networks (Anderson and 
Tushman 1990) and contacts in order to build system coalitions (Rosenkopf and 
Tushman 1998). Social, political and organisational features can also explain the 
emergence of different dominant designs across countries (Chesborough 1999). Some 
researchers have started to focus on how cultural and cognitive factors influence 
technology development (Garud and Rappa, 1994)- as when, for example, actors 
purposefully manipulate others’ ‘technological frames’ in order to influence a 
technological trajectory (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). In the case of emerging markets, 
                                                 
1 It is important to highlight that firms within Pavitt's taxonomy present technology similarities but are not 
homogenous groups (Niosi 2000); the taxonomy doesn't differentiate between individual firms and their 
innovativeness within each class. 
2 The success of the open-architecture PC (Personal Computer) which followed IBM’s efforts to control the 
interconnection of third party add-in cards and the subsequent marginalisation of Apple’s closed standards system in 
the 1980s is a classical example of this process. 
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competitors try to define the attributes of quality of the new product, which again 
influences the eventual shape of the dominant design (Porac et al, 2001). 
 
e) Path dependency and path creation 
 
The direction of technical change is path-dependent, in the sense that past decisions 
constrain future options, sometimes irrevocably because the costs of ‘reversing’ or 
‘switching’ is prohibitive.  Actors invest in relationship specific assets, develop routines 
or accumulate capabilities through processes of learning by doing which make them 
more efficient in the short term (Nelson and Winter, 1982), but create rigidities down 
the line and obstruct adaptation to shifts in the competitive environment  (Sydow et al, 
2009). At the systems level, path dependence may amount to lock-in when the 
accumulation of platform-specific capabilities, network externalities and coordination 
costs prohibit the adoption of superior alternatives because, given prior commitments 
and experience with the incumbent technology, the alternatives cannot be produced as 
effectively (David 1985, Arthur 1989). In the case of dominant designs whose 
emergence is linked to path-dependent processes such as those that have been 
described above, a convergence in production models and organisational arrangements 
between firms might initiate processes of institutional isomorphism hindering change 
even further (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
 
Recent analysis of entrepreneurial behaviour have emphasised the need to complement 
understandings of technology evolution as a path-dependent process with a more 
explicit consideration of ‘path creating’ behaviours, where actors who are mindful of 
their position within a historically determined trajectory exercise their agency to 
deviate or ‘break away’ from it (Garud and Karnøe, 2001). New paths have to originate 
with specific actors and growing attention is being paid to the social structures that 
support such innovation or serve as a barrier to it. 
 
d) Communities of practice 
 
Communities (or networks) of practice are social groups organised around a specific 
practice, with a shared identity, preferred tools and techniques, language and norms of 
behaviour (Lave and Wenger, 1990, Seely Brown and Duguid, 1991, Amin and Roberts, 
2008). The ‘standardisation’ of values, languages and tools reduces the scope for 
disagreement within a given community (Mateos-Garcia and Steinmueller, 2008), and 
facilitates the accumulation of knowledge that contributes to incremental 
improvements in the relevant practice and its associated technologies (Powell, 2000).  
Because they tend to cut across different firms, communities of practice also play an 
important role in the diffusion of information across and within industrial sectors 
(Seely Brown and Duguid, 2001).  
 
Communities of practice play an important role in knowledge-based industries, where 
they influence the direction of technical change of the organisations where they operate 
through their knowledge accumulation function (Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1998). As 
they disseminate that knowledge across organisational boundaries (Godoe, 2000), they 
favour the diffusion of innovations within a sector. Insofar they have homogenised 
skillsets and values, they can drive processes of institutional isomorphism inside it 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This isomorphism increases the efficiency of the labour 
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market and decreases training costs for firms, but it can also be a source of rigidities, 
because these communities develop their practices in an incremental- and crucially, 
path dependent- way, and their recruitment processes can induce homogeneity in 
participants (Lave and Wenger, 1991, Mateos-Garcia and Steinmueller, 2008). Research 
on innovation at both the firm and the network level underscore the detrimental effect 
that excessively rapid socialisation of individuals in their groups can have on modes of 
exploratory innovation by comparison to more exploitative ones (March, 1991, Uzzi and 
Spiro, 2005). 
 
Managers face trade-offs in managing the behaviour of communities of practice, not 
least because of principal-agent problems (Nohria and Gulati, 1996). The goals of the 
community of practice to which an employee belongs might not be aligned with those of 
the firm that employs her. The literature has identified many tensions between the 
aspirations and values of practitioners and managers in regards to the adoption of 
informal work practices which contravene established processes, and the leakage of 
valuable information to competitors (Augsdorfer, 2005, Brown and Duguid, 1991, 
2001). Community bonds are often stronger than corporate ones-  As one manager 
points out when describing the behaviour of IT professionals in the Silicon Valley: 
‘There are a lot of people who come to work in the morning believing that they work for 
Silicon Valley’ (Saxenian, 1994: 34).  
 
b) Communities of developers in the video games sector 
 
The video games sector has its root in the innovative activities of the users of some of 
the earliest computer systems. The first interactive video game, Space War, was created 
in 1961 by a member of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Tech Model Railroad 
Club in order to demonstrate the capabilities of DEC’s PDP-1. Space War was shared 
freely with other users, who contributed their own improvements to the game (Levy, 
1974). These individuals drew on science-fiction, fantasy and military themes popular 
in their technical milieus (Kendall, 1999, Levy 1974) as the basis for their games. 
 
The evolution of the video games sector in different territories presents country-
specific aspects reflecting available capabilities and resources.  While in Japan, the 
sector grew around Nintendo, and drew on a large workforce of animators from the 
Manga and Anime industries (Aoyama and Izushi, 2003), the UK’s game industry was 
built by a generation of ‘bedroom’ coders who learned their trade on cheap 
programmable home computers over the 1980s (Izushi and Aoyama, 2006) and were 
influenced by science fiction in print and in films and television. In the case of the USA, 
Atari initially hired talented software programmers in Silicon Valley who preferred to 
work in a creative sector, rather than for the military (Izushi and Aoyama, 2006). What 
all these different development territories share is that, almost without exception, video 
games development studios were started by avid game consumers who, at some point 
turned their hobby into a professional career (Kushner, 2004). 
 
Video game developers have traditionally maintained a close relationship with the 
communities of users where they originated. Games studios frequently release tools and 
engines which enable their users to customise, improve and augment their games, for 
example by creating new scenarios or ‘levels’ (Raymond, 2001). Participation in these 
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modding communities is important gateway into the sector’s workforce (Humphreys et 
al, 2005, Flowers et al, 2008).  
 
2. Empirical setting: the structure and evolution of the console games sector 
 
a) The console games sector 
 
In 2008, software revenues for the console games sector comprised $27 Billion, 
approximately half of overall revenues in games markets (PwC 2008). Differently from 
other multi-purpose platforms where video games can be consumed, such as PCs or 
mobile phones, each console platform has standardised hardware. As such, it 
constitutes a stable development target for game development studios. This also means 
that consoles have evolved in discrete leaps, where platform holders orchestrate the 
launch of subsequent ‘generations’ with improved hardware and graphical 
performance, support for new media, or modified user interfaces.  
 
The latest (7th) generation of console hardware, introduced between 2005 and 2006 
includes three systems: Nintendo’s Wii, Microsoft’s Xbox360 and Sony’s PlayStation 3, 
each with their own portfolios of compatible games. Competition in the market presents 
direct and indirect network externalities (Schilling, 2003, Clements and Ohashi, 2004): 
platform-holders compete for users and complementors (independent video games 
studios), as it is the content that these produce which makes their systems attractive for 
users. They try to secure ‘exclusives’ from developers, or produce them through their 
in-house studios (Afuah and Grimaldi, 2005, Schilling, 2003).  Complementors decide 
which platforms to target on the basis of the installed user base, levels of competition in 
the platform and its technological capabilities (Shankar and Bayus, 2003). With 
increasing frequency, they launch their games across platforms in order to target larger 
installed user bases (Barton et al, 2007). 
 
b) Dominant designs in the console sector 
 
Console games systems integrate platform hardware, user interface, and games content. 
The former two components are, with some exceptions, developed and manufactured 
by platform-owners. Games studios create content that harnesses the capabilities of a 
platform’s hardware, and which is adapted to its user interface. Both activities are 
tightly interlinked: hardware capabilities and user interface constrain the games that 
can be developed for a given platform, and impact on development costs. 
 
This paper considers ‘games consoles systems’ as a technology domain that until its last 
generation evolved following a technological trajectory instantiated in a set of 
incrementally improved configurations of hardware, user-interface and content.  
Platform-holders have changed- some of them, such as Atari and Sega, exited, while 
there have been new entrants, such as Microsoft.  Nonetheless, systems have evolved 
following a stable path, with allied creative outputs and production models which, when 
considered collectively, can be meaningfully described as a ‘dominant design’.3  
                                                 
3 Evidence of the evolution of the industry suggests that in some cases it was the platform-holders that deviated from 
this trajectory the ones that eventually had to abandon the market. For example, Panasonic adopted a different 
business model where console prices were not subsidised for consumers, while SNK produced a system with 
graphical capabilities ahead of its competitors, but much more expensive for consumers- and developers. 
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On the hardware side, subsequent console generations have experienced a trajectory of 
rapid improvement in performance visible when examining the growth in processing 
power of the chips embedded in the console generations released over the last 15 years. 
As table 1 shows, although each leap in performance is remarkable, when considered 
from a historical perspective, a clear pattern is observable: each new generation has 
represented, for all competing platforms, a leap of an order of magnitude in the 
processing power available for games developers. The exception to this is Nintendo’s 7th 
generation, which will be examined in detail below. In regards to the user-interface, the 
path of improvement has also been clearly incremental, and based on a well-established 
type of game control- the ‘gamepad’ (see exhibit 1).  
 
If on the platform side, the dominant design has been an increasingly powerful 
hardware device which is manipulated through a standardised user interface, on the 
developer side, the increasing costs of development to target that platform have led to 
the emergence of a dominant type of game, usually referred to as the ‘triple A’ (Tschang, 
2007). Triple A games are heavily promoted, have high levels of graphical polish that 
exploit improved graphical capabilities, and target well-established genres. They are 
usually released with the aim of establishing a franchise, where investments in new 
content and technology can be spread across subsequent sequels (Grantham and 
Kaplinski, 2005). 
 
c) Triple A as an unsustainable dominant design 
 
Although focussing on established franchises and genres, and undertaking substantial 
investments on promotion could be expected to reduce the risks of games development 
targeting the latest generation of hardware, in effect this trend has led to increased 
levels of competition between very similar ‘blockbuster products’ launched within tight 
release windows. 
 
Escalating levels of investment are not only associated to increasing financial risks in 
video games production- triple A projects also require larger team sizes, which creates 
project management challenges well known from software engineering (Brooks, 1982). 
As games have increased in scope and complexity, delays, overshot budgets and quality 
issues have become more frequent (Sapsed and Mateos-Garcia, 2008). 
 
The escalation in budgets has not been accompanied by corresponding increases in the 
size of the market: the intensified levels of competition within slow growth market 
segments has reduced margins, and impacted on the sector’s profitability- only 4% of 
the games that go into production, and 20% of those which are eventually launched, 
manage to cover their costs (Reisinger, 2008, Brightman, 2008). Video games studios 
producing ‘triple A’ games that harness the processing power of the dominant design 
consoles find themselves in a ‘red queen’ situation where they need to ‘run faster in 
order to remain in the same place’ (Barnett and Hansen, 1996). 
 
d) The Wii as an alternative dominant design 
 
With the launch of its Wii system, Nintendo has introduced an alternative dominant 
design for the sector. Differently from its competitors in the 7th console generation, the 
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Wii does not represent a substantial improvement in terms of hardware power (see 
table 1) or graphical capabilities, as it is not enabled for high definition Television sets. 
The main difference between the Wii and its competitors is the motion sensitive user 
interface, which as Exhibit 1 shows, constitutes an important departure from the 
standard ‘gamepad’ remote which until then has been dominant until the last console 
generation.  
 
The launch of the Wii has been explicitly inspired by the ‘Blue Ocean Strategy’ aimed at 
creating new markets, instead of competing within established ones (Kim and 
Mauborgne, 2005). Differently from its competitors, which focus on core ‘gamer’ 
audiences that demand highly immersive products within well-established genres such 
as First Person Shooters or Role-Playing Games (Juul, 2009), Nintendo has targeted 
demographics so far untapped by the console games sector- particularly women and 
older people (Aoyama and Izushi, 2007). These differences are reflected in the ‘flagship’ 
games that have accompanied the launch of each of the three competing consoles (see 
table 3).  
 
Nintendo’s strategy has paid off in terms of sales (table 3)- as of the end of 2009, the 
installed base for Nintendo’s Wii was almost double that of either of its competitors. 
Because its system is less technically sophisticated and costly to manufacture than 
Sony’s and Microsoft, Nintendo has also been able to make a profit on each unit sold 
since its launch (Surette, 2006). 
 
The alternative, less technically sophisticated dominant design introduced by Nintendo 
requires smaller investments, team sizes and development timescales (table 3) than it is 
the case with its competitor platforms. This suggests the possibility of a new dominant 
design on the content side of the games console sector which is more sustainable than 
the current ‘Triple A’ game. 
 
e) The studios’ reaction 
 
The Wii appears as an attractive development target for games studios: its installed 
user base is almost double that of either of its competitors, and producing games for it is 
less costly.4 It represents a potential opportunity to escape from the increasingly 
uneconomical dynamics of competition present in consoles with more advanced 
technical capabilities. 
 
Yet there is strong evidence suggesting that most established games studios- and 
particularly independents- studios not owned by any large publishing houses or mass-
media conglomerates- have continued targeting the Xbox360 and PS3 instead of the Wii. 
Outside of Nintendo, there seems to be little appetite for investing in the Wii console- all 
10 top-selling games for the Nintendo Wii since its launch have been developed by 
Nintendo’s own studios. By contrast, 6 out of the 10 best selling PlayStation 3 games, 
and 8 out of the 10 best selling games for the Xbox360 were developed by third parties.5  
 
                                                 
4 Although this could be expected to lower barriers to entry for the Wii and increase competition in the platform, past 
studies have shown that the installed user base variable is a much stronger predictor of studios’ decision to target a 
platform than the presence of competitors (Venkatraman and Lee, 2004). 
5 http://vgsales.wikia.com/wiki/Best_selling_games_%28seventh_generation%29  
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Table 4 shows the breakdown of games launches by independent developers featured in 
the list of top 100 global studios elaborated by Develop, a trade magazine, in 2009. 
Overall, for each game release for the Wii, these studios have produced almost 8 games 
targeting the Xbox360 and/or PlayStation 3.6 It is important to take into account, when 
interpreting these figures, that most games that are not produced exclusively for the Wii 
tend to be ‘downgraded’ versions originally developed for other platforms (including 
both next generation consoles and PlayStation 2, the last-generation version of Sony’s 
platform, which has similar graphics and hardware capabilities to the Wii).7  
 
e) Explaining an anomalous behaviour 
 
In spite of its mass-market success, and the reduced costs and complexity of developing 
games for it, the Wii has failed to attract complementary investments from games 
studios that remain focused on its competitors. 
 
This suggests the existence of inertias in the behaviour of established games studios. 
These could be linked to the existence of switching costs, that is, past investments in 
technologies and capabilities that hinder their transition to a new platform. However, 
the fact that the Nintendo Wii does not constitute, at least in its hardware, a radical 
departure from consoles in previous generations, makes this unlikely.8 Another 
potential explanation for the observed trend is that the Wii constitutes an architectural 
innovation that developers have been unable to adopt successfully with their existing 
capabilities (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Although this is a compelling explanation- the 
innovation introduced by the Wii is its user interface, which defines the way in which a 
game is ultimately consumed by users, as table 4 shows, a significant share of studios 
(more than half in those considered) has not yet tried to release any games for the 
platform.  
 
An alternative hypothesis for the observed trends is developed in the following section 
drawing on an in-depth study of the values, practices and behaviours of games studios 
and communities at the firm-level. This analysis suggests that the cultural values and 
aspirations of the communities of games developers working in studios, as perpetuated 
through established organisational and recruitment practices, play a crucial role in 
shaping their innovation strategies, leading to the trends which are observed at the 
sector level. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
 
Data have been collected and analysed across multiple research sites using grounded 
theory techniques (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The adoption of this approach is justified 
by the exploratory nature of the research- With the exception of Tschang (2007) and 
Cohendet and Simon (2007), there are no other academic studies that have examined 
in-depth the development practices of video games studios, and the behaviour of their 
professional communities. The purpose of this research effort is to, following  the 
                                                 
6 Even when allowing for cross-platform releases targeting both Xbox360 and PlayStation, the ratio is still of 
approximately 4 to 1. 
7 These games are usually referred to as ‘shovelware’ (GWNightmare, 2010). 
8 Particularly when considering the fact that developers have been able to adapt to significant modifications in chip 
architectures and larger storage devices in the Wii’s competitors 
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methodological approach postulated in Eisenhardt (1989) and implemented by Uzzi 
(1995) or Hargadon and Sutton (1997), build a rich understanding of the organisational 
milieu in question prior to the development of empirically grounded, testable 
hypotheses addressing the causal relationships between the relevant constructs. 
 
The dataset arises from 33 semi-structured interviews in 7 UK games studios. The 
studios in the sample have been drawn from a population with capabilities across 
platforms; namely, consoles (fixed and handheld) and online. The companies have been 
selected in the first instance as creative exemplars with respect to the development and 
management of valuable intellectual property- including characters and franchises- 
across a wide range of games genres. By introducing variation in the sample, the 
research team has been able to examine development practices, innovation processes 
and workforce behaviour in different market and technology contexts. 
 
The interviews have been conducted in pairs – two researchers attending every 
interview- at the studio’s premises between June and October 2008. The interviewees 
have been selected to represent the important creative functions within the studio – art, 
design, coding. The research team has also secured inputs from project managers 
and/or producers, as well as studio personnel with strategic roles and insights, such as 
managing directors or chief technology officers. Additionally, the research team has had 
access to internal documents, including organisation charts and product design 
documents. When relevant, the team has complemented these primary data with 
secondary sources, including the trade press and other publicly available information. 
 
The data generated have constituted, once transcribed, the starting point in an inductive 
process involving constant iteration of the concepts and a collapsing of emergent 
concepts and themes. By this method, the resultant hypotheses and subsequent theory 
are consistent with – and grounded in – data, both formal and observational (Martin 
and Turner, 1986). The coding has been undertaken independently by two researchers 
in order to ensure construct validity, using Nvivo7 qualitative research software.  
 
The emergent findings from the research have been – in half of the cases –subject to 
additional discussion, validation and augmentation at company workshops held at the 
researchers’ premises, as well as presentation in two events aimed at games 
professionals. 
 
In the case of one of the studios, the research team has convened two follow-up idea 
generation events aimed at addressing some of the issues identified during the studio-
level workshops, with the participation of 80 employees. The researchers have adopted 
a participant observer role in these events, facilitating and contributing to the 
discussions, and collecting additional data in the shape of diagrams, graphs and idea 
prototypes.  
 
4. Findings 
 
This section begins with an overview of the composition of the workforce in the 
examined studios. Afterwards, it describes the 6 themes that have emerged from the 
systematic analysis of the data generated in the interviews. The themes are classified 
inside two categories- ‘dimensions of quality’, concerning the motivations and goals of 
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studios and their workforces, and ‘development practices’, that is, the processes and 
methodologies through which those goals are realised. Tables 5a and 5b present, for 
each of the studios in the sample, representative excerpts from the interviews classified 
inside the emerging themes.9 
 
a) Composition of the workforce 
 
The seven studios in the sample are male dominated - only two women have been 
interviewed during the research. Where women are employed, they are located in 
administrative or managerial positions.  The age of the interviewees ranges from late 
20s to early 50s – with some of the personnel being self-described ‘veterans’ with over 
30 years in the sector. Nevertheless, there is a general perception that games 
development is better suited for younger people.  
 
Seventeen interviewees have undertaken university-level courses in a related subject 
such as programming or fine art. The same number report no industry experience 
outside of the games sector, having entered development immediately after finishing 
their education. 
 
b) Development practice: Gaming employees 
 
Although they have not been asked explicitly whether they are gamers, 12 interviewees 
immediately describe themselves as such, with 4 reporting that they designed their own 
games prior to becoming professional games developers. Two of the studios make it 
explicit that they will not consider recruiting ‘non-gamers’, while a third one 
differentiates between recruiting ‘professional games developers’ with experience in 
the industry, and hobbyists from mod communities.  
 
The boundary between professional games development and participation in gaming 
communities is very porous. Games developers play games continuously, for their own 
enjoyment or in order to research competing products.  At the same time, gamers try to 
gain employment in the sector.  ‘Testing’, the lowest paid function in video games 
development, is one of their main entry points- a passion for video games is the primary 
qualification required for this position. Three interviewees report having begun their 
professional career as video games developers in testing.  
 
There are some exceptions to this recruitment approach. Studio Social explicitly 
attempts to recruit employees with creative interests outside of games; for example, 
musicians and graphic designers. Studio Racing actively seeks to recruit project 
managers from outside of the sector rather than through internal promotion of 
experienced developers. 
 
c) Dimensions of quality: creative freedom in narrow domains 
 
All studios give their staff some scope to exercise their creativity- it is argued that a 
degree of creative freedom is the reason why they are in the sector in the first place. 
Excessively formalised processes, or overbearing managerial oversight is seen as 
                                                 
9 Note that not all relevant themes are addressed for every studio. This is a consequence of the emergent nature of 
theory development across subsequent iterations of the research process in different empirical settings. 
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demoralising. By enabling their employees to be creative, studios bring new ideas into 
their development projects, and encourage peer competition between members of the 
development teams. As employees incorporate their own ideas into a project, they 
achieve a feeling of ownership over it, which increases their levels of commitment.  It is 
acknowledged that those individuals who contribute a new idea should also be 
responsible for its implementation. 
 
But the pool of influences from which developers draw when they exercise their 
creativity is narrow. When interviewees describe experimentation, or ‘trying out new 
ideas’, it is often by comparison to the features or levels of polish of other games within 
the same genre. Creativity is thus exercised in order to reach the levels of quality of 
other ‘exemplary’ games that the developers admire, or in order to introduce a degree 
of differentiation which will set the game apart from the competition, while appealing to 
audience within the same genre. 
 
The research team had the opportunity to witness the creative processes of one of the 
studios at work during an idea-generation workshop held at at the university. Although 
the event was framed with the purpose of generating new ‘casual games for non-gaming 
audiences’ concepts, the majority of the ideas that were put forward by different 
brainstorming groups had Science-fiction, Fantasy or Adventure themes and, without 
exception, made explicit reference to other successful games in the traditional market. 
 
d) Development practice: unpaid overtime 
 
Differently from other software development activities, the feature set for video games 
tend not to be clearly defined at the onset of a project- it is always possible to invest 
more time on polishing the product, or include an extra feature. As these tasks tend not 
to be scheduled in the initial work-plan for the project, or budgeted for, they frequently 
require developers to engage in ‘crunch’ (unpaid overtime).  
 
Crunch is described as an undesirable- albeit necessary- means to achieve quality. Some 
interviewees refer to it as the unavoidable outcome of working in firm a creative 
industry where employees are intrinsically motivated to produce the best game that 
they possibly can.  Although some interviewees adopt a cavalier attitude towards 
crunch, referring to it a ‘badge of honour’ or a demonstration of their passion for what 
they do, others complain that it occurs with excessive frequency, because of lack of 
professionalism, or unwillingness to ‘rein-in’ the scope of the project.  
 
Studio Social is the exception- this company has implemented an explicit ‘no crunch’ 
policy, where developers are asked to work 8 ‘solid hours’ a day, from 9 to 5, without 
access to the Internet or the constant interruptions to play video games that are 
frequent in other studios. In exchange, the managers guarantee that there will be ‘no 
crunch’. This studio has implemented a tight development cycle with high levels of 
redundancy in the schedules, and a realistic scope for every deliverable which enables it 
to fulfil its objectives on time and budget. The adoption of this strategy is seen not only 
as a way of increasing the quality of life of the employees, and deliver superior products, 
but also as a way of attracting talent from outside established gamer communities. 
 
d) Development practices: Management and training 
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Internal promotion of experienced developers to managerial positions is the norm in 
the sector. None of the interviewees report having received management training as 
part of their promotion. When studios have implemented new product development 
approaches such as ‘Agile Programming’- a set of practices that is becoming increasingly 
popular in the industry-, the managers have taught themselves about its principles in 
their leisure time. In one of the studios, the implementation of this new development 
approach without the necessary know-how is reported to have produced catastrophic 
consequences for a project, and high levels of crunch. 
 
Where training has occurred, it has either been retrospective or external to the studio. 
One of the interviewees reports having consciously left the games sector in order to 
acquire some project management experience ‘in the real world’. Studio Racing, as 
highlighted previously, recruits its managers from outside of the video games sector. 
They have brought into the company formal project management skills and tools such 
as Prince2 or SixSigma accreditation. 
 
d) Dimensions of quality: realism and authenticity 
 
Interviewees in 5 of the studios report that achieving high levels of realism in the 
product is an important goal. Realism is achieved through innovation in the techniques 
with which the graphical capabilities of consoles hardware are exploited, in the design 
of the game levels, and in the use of historical references and documentation to create 
content and a believable ‘handling’ of weapons and vehicles.  
 
Some interviewees- particularly video games artists- show a degree of exhaustion with 
this emphasis on realism. According to them, the ‘photorealism’ trend has entered in 
decreasing returns in terms of the results that can be achieved with available resources, 
or even meaningfully perceived by users, and constrains their creativity. They 
nevertheless acknowledge that they strive to achieve the graphical benchmarks of other 
‘exemplary’ games in the market. 
 
Social Studio constitutes an exception in the sample, as the audiences for its products 
are less demanding in terms of graphical prowess. Artists in this studio try to make 
their products look ‘less gamey’, drawing on influences from other creative media, such 
as television and animation. 
 
e) Dimensions of quality: who is the audience? 
 
Four studios in the sample point out that their focus is on core gaming markets. This is 
reflected in their testing strategies, which- when present- draw on internal QA teams of 
seasoned gamers, or on user testing with groups of gamers. By contrast, developers in 
Social Studio test their games with members of their own families, as well as randomly 
chosen groups representative of the general- as compared to the ‘gamer’- population. 
Studio Racing describes its latest project as an ‘arcade’ (instead of ‘simulation’) racing 
experience with potential appeal beyond the ‘racing genre’, although not necessarily 
extending into wider audiences. The project discussed by Studio Music targets the 
music games market, which is perceived to include more causal audiences. But even 
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then, the interviewees point out that their product is focussed on the ‘experienced’ 
fringe of this market.  
 
Developers also place great importance on review ratings from the specialist gaming 
press as an indicator or project success- 4 interviewees indicate that achieving high 
ratings justifies additional investments in a project, in terms of time and resources at a 
latter stage of a project, including crunch. Although one interviewee explicitly links 
these review scores with higher sales, the other three see them as goals in themselves, 
which when achieved, validate the effort put in the project and increase external esteem 
for the studio. 
 
Although the interviewees acknowledge the success of Nintendo’s Wii console, few of 
them express interest in producing games for it- they disparage it as ‘gimmicky’, and as 
a ‘fad’. They do, however, point out that the influx of wider demographics into the 
gaming market can be beneficial for them, as some of the consumers who get 
acquainted with games by playing the Wii will eventually demand more immersive 
experiences. 
 
a) Discussion of results 
 
The picture emerging from the qualitative stage of the research is that of a highly 
committed and intrinsically motivated workforce, stemming from the fact that most 
interviewees are avid gamers themselves, and consider working in the sector as a 
reward in itself.  
 
There are benefits to recruiting from this ‘amateur’ talent pool. Experienced gamers are 
‘lead users’ ahead of mass-market demand (Von Hippel 1994). By hiring them, studios 
are able to access ‘sticky information’ that supports their innovation strategies; for 
example when their employees test and suggest improvements for the products being 
developed.  
 
The presence of intrinsic motivations increases employee effort and creative 
performance as compared to purely monetary rewards (Amabile et al, 1996). The 
developers’ willingness to work unpaid overtime is a manifestation of these intrinsic 
motivations. It enables studios to increase productivity for a given level of resources, 
and in some cases, deliver projects without the need to increase team sizes, a source of 
important managerial challenges in software development (Brooks 1989). 
 
However, the use of such intrinsically motivated workforce also presents important 
drawbacks. An acceptance of ‘crunch’ reduces the need for studios to address the 
underlying reasons why they systematically fail to deliver on their deadlines, or achieve 
acceptable levels of quality- because, for example, their innovation strategy is 
unsuatainable. In other occasions, creativity can be, in itself, a source of ‘feature creep’ 
leading to crunch (Grantham and Kaplinski,2005). As the interviews above and 
secondary data from the sector show, this work practice seems to be in fact 
institutionalised, in spite of the controversies that it has generated in the past (IGDA, 
2004). By decreasing real wages and producing a deterioration in the quality of life of 
the sector, it might also be discouraging potential new talent which is not as 
intrinsically motivated as the members of gaming communities.  
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There is strong evidence supporting this emergent finding about the composition and 
extraction of the games workforce. Recent surveys show that this workforce is heavily 
skewed towards the demographics of ‘core’ gamers. According to a survey of the UK 
Media Workforce undertaken by Skillset in 2008 the computer games sector has the 
smallest proportion of female employees of all those considered- 12% as compared to 
an average of 38% for all sectors (Skillset, 2009). This figure falls in line with the results 
of the Independent Games Developers Association Diversity Survey of US studios (IGDA, 
2005). 
 
The situation is similar in regards to the age of the games sector workforce- an IGDA 
Quality of Life Survey undertaken in 2004 shows that 34.3% of respondents expected to 
leave the industry within the next 5 years, and more than half within the next 10 years. 
These results are also reflected in the aforementioned Skillset survey, which shows that 
games developers are, on average, much younger than the workforce in other creative 
industries, and the least likely creative professionals to have dependent children 
(Skillset, 2009). 
 
Managerial action can help to restrain intrinsically motivated creativity and keep 
products focussed, reducing the need to crunch. It can also help to bring more diverse 
talent into the sector. But project managers and producers are, almost without 
exception, experienced leads promoted on the basis of their technical or creative 
proficiency. This strategy is aligned with the social dynamics of communities of practice 
where technical excellence and knowledge of the practice constitute the crucial 
dimensions of peer respect and reputation, as compared to formal positions within an 
organisational structure (Levy, 1974, Mateos-Garcia and Steinmueller, 2003). But they 
lead to homogeneity and the practices that reinforce it, across the sector’s managerial 
structure. 
 
Cultural homogeneity in the workforce leads to the ‘introspective tendencies’ identified 
in the data. Studios tend to make ‘the games they want to make’, with only marginal 
attention- or even respect for- wider audiences. This impacts on the dominant definition 
of quality- something that is realistic, visually striking, technically sophisticated and 
‘cool’, and will be respected by other peers and the specialist games press. It also results 
on the adoption of usability testing practices that assume a high level of user 
proficiency. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
a) The micro-level drivers of the console games sector technological evolution 
 
Section 2 has described the historical trajectory of the console games sector, and the 
emergence of a dominant design where hardware and content are integrated with a 
production model (and cost structure) which is uneconomical for most participants. In 
this context, Nintendo’s Wii, has emerged as an alternative design with a focus on user 
interface innovation as compared to exploitation of enhanced hardware capabilities, 
enabling developers to produce games more inexpensively, and targeting wider 
audiences. But available evidence shows little developer support for the platform four 
years after its introduction. This suggests the existence of inertias in the behaviours of 
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development studios, which have been explored through the in-depth qualitative study 
of their innovation strategies, resources and processes presented in Section 3. 
 
This analysis has identified several features of games studios which help to explain their 
persistent focus on established games and more powerful- and expensive to target- 
platforms.  As described above, studios maintain close relationships with communities 
of core gamers from which they recruit their staff. Although this is beneficial in terms of 
employee commitment and output, it also precludes access to new perspectives and 
sources of inspiration. Studies of communities of practice and networks with high 
barriers to entry and stable relationships, have shown that a low inflow of new, 
challenging and diverse points of view, inspirations and skillsets can produce rigidities 
and creative stagnation (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005, March, 1991). As James March points out 
in his landmark paper on exploration and exploitation in organisational learning, 
 
‘Mutual learning leads to convergence between organizational and individual 
beliefs. The convergence is generally useful both for individuals and for an 
organization. However, a major threat to the effectiveness of such learning is the 
possibility that individuals will adjust to an organizational code before the code 
can learn from them. Relatively slow socialization of new organizational members 
and moderate turnover sustain variability in individual beliefs, thereby  
improving organizational and average individual knowledge in the long run’ 
(March, 1991, P. 85) 
 
The homogeneity- and rapid socialisation- that prevail in the games sector’s workforce 
produces several benefits that have been described above. But it also locks games 
studios into an ‘introspective’ and self-referential trajectory of improvement along 
conventional dimensions of quality- graphical polish and ‘cool features’ in triple A 
games- instead of encouraging them to explore new genres, or target emerging 
platform. 
 
Recent data from the sector suggest that these innovation behaviours are constraining 
the availability of quality content for the Wii, thus reducing the attractiveness of this 
platform. They also impact on the profitability of the company, by reducing the royalties 
that it is able to generate through the sale of third-party games (Nintendo, 2009). 
Insofar the culturally-determined behaviours of studios impact on the competitiveness 
of alternative dominant designs available in the market, they crucially shape the future 
evolution of the sector. 
 
b) Contributions 
 
This paper contributes to recent discussions within the path-dependence literature, 
which have called for more explicit analyses of the inter-connections between path 
dependent dynamics at the organisational, relationship and sector level (Sydow et al, 
2009). It does so by articulating the way in which firm-level recruitment practices and 
development processes shape the implementation of specific innovation strategies that 
focus on exploitation of established genres and audiences (‘old certainties’) at the 
expense of the exploration of new possibilities. These strategies, when considered at the 
sector level, inform the decision to target potential dominant designs competing in the 
market, and shapes the technological trajectory of the sector. 
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The paper also contributes to an emerging body of literature that examines the role that 
social, cultural and cognitive factors play in shaping the direction of technical change in 
industrial sectors, and provides a necessary, perhaps ‘softer’ complement to the focus 
on market size and economically driven decision-making that underpins dominant 
understandings of competition in networked platforms. Insofar culturally (and 
intrinsically) determined innovation strategies increase the availability of 
complementary outputs for competing networked platforms, they can have an 
important impact on market outcomes. 
 
The paper suggests that, in addition to path-dependent behaviours which are 
constrained by the accumulation of capabilities and switching costs, locking helpless 
actors into a sub-optimal situation, and path creation behaviours where actors exercise 
agency in order to break away from a established path and find new optima, it is 
important to consider a third possibility. In this case, actors exercise agency to sustain a 
trajectory which on the basis of their own subjective, culturally determined criteria, is 
preferable. The prevalence of this third kind of behaviour in some sectors with 
intrinsically motivated workforces- such as the creative industries, or open source 
communities- could explain the proliferation of small market niches defined along the 
lines of specific ‘genres’ or ‘production processes’, to the dismay of policymakers keen 
to promote the commercial growth of these industries (Andari et al, 2007). 
 
In articulating the mechanisms through which the incrementally innovative behaviours 
of video games studios are perpetuated, the paper rings a cautionary note regarding the 
extent to which corporations should listen, or indeed, hire their users. As Nintendo’s 
CEO states, ‘Nintendo has grasped two important notions that have eluded its 
competitors. The first is, Don’t listen to your customers. The hardcore gaming community 
is extremely vocal -- they blog a lot -- but if Nintendo kept listening to them, hard-core 
gamers would be the only audience it ever had.” (quoted in Aoyama and Izushi, (2008)). 
It also identifies potential action points that can help video games studios to break away 
from established paths by altering their recruitment and development practices to bring 
new talent pools into the sector.  
 
c) Limitations and issues for further research 
 
The qualitative analysis presented in this paper has led to the identification of 
mechanisms that, it is argued, play an important role in shaping the emergence of 
specific dominant designs in the console games sector. Although the adoption of an in-
depth, multi-site qualitative research design is justified by the relatively novelty of the 
organisational setting under consideration, this approach also limits the extent to which 
inferences can be reliably drawn between the firm-level findings and the sectoral 
outcomes. The results of the paper are however amenable to operationalisation into a 
set of testable hypotheses regarding the causal relationships between firm-level 
recruitment and development practices, composition of the workforce and type of 
innovation strategy and target platforms that are adopted.  
 
This paper has not examined in detail the historical factors that influenced the design 
and launch of past generations of video games consoles. An assumption has been made 
that such design was informed by studios’ demands for increased processing and 
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graphic power, and storage space, which enabled them to continue improving their 
games along culturally-established dimensions of quality. Although historical accounts 
of the evolution of the sector (Kent, 2001) lend support to this assumption, further 
primary research should contribute to assert its reliability.  
 
The paper has focussed on communities of video games developer as a ‘monolithic 
construct’. However, and as some of the emergent findings suggest, there is a degree of 
heterogeneity in the aspirations, goals and values of the different disciplines that 
constitute it.. Further analyses of the motivations, behaviours and strategies for 
coordination between different games development disciplines are likely to produce 
valuable insights about the management of innovation in games studios, and 
interdisciplinary project-based organisations more widely. 
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Appendix: Figures 
 
Exhibit 1: User interfaces across the last three console generations 
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Figure 1: Evolution of processing power through the last 4 console generations 
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Table 1: Flagship launch titles for Next Generation Consoles 
  
Platform Game Age Rating Brief description 
Wii Wii Sports All Ages “Players grab the controller like 
a racket and swing – the game 
will register forehands, 
backhands, volleys, lobs, slices, 
spin and power depending on 
how fast the user swings and at 
what angle. Don't worry about 
moving around the court to get 
to the ball – the game 
automatically moves players 
into position.” 
PlayStation 3 Resistance Fall of 
Man 
Mature “In Resistance: Fall of Man, the 
U.S. and Britain band together 
in a last-ditch effort to save 
Europe and Asia from a horrific 
scourge. In mere decades, the 
Chimera - a species of unknown 
origin propagating a virus that 
converts other life forms into 
more Chimera - has overrun 
Russia and all of Europe.” 
Xbox360 Gears of War Mature “Gears of War thrusts gamers 
into a deep and harrowing 
story of humankind’s epic 
battle for survival against the 
Locust Horde, a nightmarish 
race of creatures that surface 
from the bowels of the planet.” 
Source: games press releases 
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Table 2: Global sales for Next-Generation Consoles 
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Table 3: Estimated development costs, team size and timescale for next 
generation video games consoles (2007) 
 
  
Microsoft Xbox 
360/PS3 Wii 
Average development costs $4.1M $3.3M 
Average team size 35-80 25-45 
Average development time 18-24 12-18 
Source: UKDTI (2007). 
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Table 4: : Next generation consoles targeted by independent studios in Develop 
Magazine’s top 100 studios for 2009. 
 
Studio Xbox360 and/or PS3 
Wii 
exclusives 
Wii non-exclusives 
and ports 
Rockstar 4 0 1 
Epic 3 0 0 
Bethesda 4 0 0 
Neversoft 10 0 6 
Valve 6 0 0 
Level 5 3 0 0 
Yuke 8 0 4 
Insomniac 5 0 0 
Criterion 2 0 0 
Rockstar San Diego 3 0 1 
Krome Studio 4 1 4 
Relentless 6 0 0 
Rebellion 3 1 2 
Bungie 2 0 0 
Atlus 6 6 0 
Relic 1 0 0 
Volition 3 0 0 
Gearbox 2 0 1 
Funcom 2 0 0 
Team 17 1 0 0 
Silicon Knights 1 0 0 
Grasshopper 2 2 0 
Frontier 1 2 1 
Totals 82 12 20 
Source: Develop Magazine, Studio websites. 
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Table 5a: Excerpts from the qualitative analysis 
 
 
Studio Development practice: Gaming Employees Development practice: Unpaid overtime Development Practice: management & skills 
Studio 
War1 
 I then got so sick of working with [….] that I 
actually rejoined the games industry.  They only 
work nine until five; they’re really lazy. 
I think it has become increasingly necessary 
to…specialise in certain things and it’s the same 
with any other profession really, where you have 
to keep updating your skills and if you don’t 
update your skills you…fall by the wayside… 
Studio 
Portable 
I’ve always played games, from when I was nine 
years old 
I started out…just with a home computer, doing it 
as a hobby, at the age of 13… I’d obviously been 
playing games for a few years before that. 
I'd rather work late, personally, and respond to 
those things as they come in...For example, the 
guys in Japan start work about midnight UK time 
and they finish by seven in the morning. So it’s 
good to make sure if we can get something out on 
that very same day, we get an extra day test on it... 
I’ve never worked on a game that’s had a solid 
design from start to finish. It doesn’t happen. 
We've got a lot of talented guys, which I would say 
is quite unusual, in my experience, to have so 
many talented guys in one place. So the bar is 
quite high… 
Studio 
Music 
I've got an X Box, quite happy with that as well, 
but because I’m in the industry…obviously I'm 
quite passionate about these games.  
I felt like there was a big wave through the 
industry where suddenly working all the hours 
God sends wasn’t quite as acceptable as it used to 
be… but I think we’re so bad as an industry in 
coordinating ourselves.  It’s still the Wild West 
and anything goes. 
…so it transitions from a working document for 
me, then a working document to me and 
management to work out what we’re going to do, 
and then becomes a working document for us and 
the publisher…But it quickly transitions to a 
library…rather than a real fleshy document. 
Studio 
Racing 
I’m not a passionate gamer.  I actually wouldn’t 
hire anybody from a games company [for 
production functions]; as a preference I would 
take them from other sectors. 
Our biggest coders who had the biggest bugs were 
still fighting through it for 45 hours a week. 
You have to temper that down to remain focused 
on what’s core about your game, because if you 
don’t, you end up getting very distracted, and you 
don’t get quality on anything.   
Studio 
Social 
I don’t want a lot of people on the edge working 
for us. The industry has suffered from making 
games for itself. Geeks making games for geeks, to 
be unkind. 
We’re very lucky here because it’s been said right 
from the start that, no, it [crunch] won’t happen. 
…we’re a small company and we haven’t got to 
that stage yet where we’re kind of trying to find 
jobs for people and having to fit in middle 
management all over the place. 
Studio 
Mod 
Since we started we have recruited 40-60 people, 
90% of which came from the community with no 
prior experience in the video game industry. This 
worked really good until this year. But now that 
we have to ship our first AAA game we have 
realised we need people with a greater level of 
industry experience. 
 As an ex-mod making team we have less 
professionalism and efficiency when it comes to 
that side of development (deliver on milestones 
etc.) but on the other hand we have more passion 
than the average game developer.  
Studio 
War2 
I don’t think we’d employ someone who’s not a 
gamer. 
Because why let the game go out and work 9 to 5, 
you could do, and your bogeyman come back, and 
maybe not have that lovely light glow, or that 
lovely…feature in it, or those nice effects…which 
will give it another 5% in review?  Or give it 
another 10% in review?  That's what you want.   
…generally the process should be: a design 
document is drawn up, that’s then passed around.  
… we'll have a meeting to discuss it, any reviews 
are made to the document…That might then go to 
the person who would actually code it up...[w]e 
then…rejig the document [and work from 
that]…the design, the document actually does 
affect the current design, rather than the ideal, 
which is what it obviously starts off as. 
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Table 5b: Excerpts from the qualitative analysis 
Studio Dimensions of quality: Creative empowerment Dimensions of quality: the audience Dimensions of quality: Authenticity & Realism 
&Studio 
War 1 
…my experience is creative people don’t work at 
their best when they have managers who really 
crack the whip and shout at people.  I think that’s 
probably true in any environment but I think 
particularly creatives just don’t respond to that. 
I’ve found it necessary, really, for most staff on the 
team to play games…you are really required to 
think about what other games are doing and what 
direction they're moving in and where the public 
are spending their money, in what genres and 
things like that. 
…we’ve spent two days up there taking high 
detailed photographs of all the weapons and their 
functionality, loading, reloading, and firing. And 
we hired 12 original World War One costumes 
from a costumier in London with all the kit 
items…helmets, boots, the whole lot. 
Studio 
Portable 
I do think it’s vital, and whenever it’s missing, for 
whatever reason, sometimes some of the crew 
will do a job that isn’t very creative, just because 
of necessity, and we try and make sure that’s for 
as short a time as possible. 
Well, obviously the QA guys are really hardcore 
gamers…to want to sit there and test games all 
day. So basically it’s input on design in terms of 
games they’ve seen or the games or ideas we’ve 
got, original ideas. 
…a lot of people were leaving it alone or going 
bust…it was extremely hard to make a living…we 
haven’t been part of that arms race, and we shall 
see what happens. 
Studio 
Music 
That is the best and most interesting part of the 
project when you’re coming up with the creative 
stuff.  You have to get into it and lose your 
perspective. 
My hope now is to just make it feel a bit more like 
a music video, and a bit less of a barrier for a non-
gamer. 
Our game is very stylised, even though we’re 
trying to make it realistic. It’s not about stylised or 
not, it’s about what fits the game…if we had a 
game which was really suited to a stylised 
approach I would be more than happy to do it.  I’m 
more bored of…gamey looking games. 
Studio 
Racing 
But…now we’re hopefully going to work on a 
game that is going to get really good reviews, and 
hopefully sell really well. But I think the 
fundamental thing was…were not afraid to try 
things out, even though it might not work. 
And then we go into another [user] test…put the 
two graphs side-by-side, you can immediately see 
the spikes. It’s a far more graphical way, you can 
really show people what progression’s being 
made and you can’t argue with it basically. 
We also had this challenge to make ourselves the 
most beautiful game in the world and we’ve done 
that. 
Studio 
Social 
…it’s an organic process within a structure, so 
there’s always time to experiment, and try new 
things…but they know they only have two days to 
do it, so they can’t be that creative. 
…they very sensibly made a point of hiring all 
sorts of different nationalities so it was kind of 
like our own little secret internal QA team… they 
were all sat there and they were great…but since 
getting rid of them… there are all sorts of 
mistakes…things that just don’t make sense. 
I think, in Europe and in the East, people are more 
open to things looking good, that don’t look real…I 
think people will always be trying to do that 
[realism] because it’s hard, and it ties into a lot of 
people’s desire to be groundbreaking. 
 
Studio 
Mod 
Few people join the video game industry because 
they want to become millionaires, you usually do 
it because I work in an office surrounded by 
action figures and aliens and stuff listening to 
heavy metal, which is way cooler than working in 
an IT office. 
You can only really sustain your integrity inside 
the community if you are not seen to sell out. The 
minute you do that you lose that core group of 
fans…It depends on your objective…maybe when 
I’m 40-50 I will be more interested in the financial 
side of things 
 
Studio 
War 2 
There is always more that you can add, and 
because it’s such a creative process, everyone 
wants to make it as good as they possibly can. 
[W]e get a lot…of gamers in from the street and 
say, look, play our game …[W]e get their feedback 
and say, what do you think of the controls; are 
they responsive enough? What do you think of the 
characters, do they look good enough? What do 
you think of the weapons…do you enjoy firing 
them…?  
We got to fire an AK47 and a M16 and…we 
recorded the sound of the weapons.  How you 
reload the weapon… for the animators to see so 
they can animate it properly. 
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